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2 
ABSTRACT 20 
Background: Ultra-processed food industry (UPFI) actors have consistently opposed statutory 21 
regulation in policy debates, including at the World Health Organization (WHO). They do so 22 
most commonly with claims that regulatory policies do not work, will have negative 23 
consequences, or that alternatives such as self-regulation work well or better. Underlying this 24 
are often claims that industry is aligned with principles of evidence-based policymaking. In 25 
this study, we interrogate if this holds true by exploring the extent and quality of the evidence 26 
UPFI respondents employed to support claims around regulatory policy, and how they did this. 27 
Methods: First, we identified all submissions from organisations who overtly represent UPFI 28 
companies to consultations held by the WHO on non-communicable disease policy between 29 
2016 and 2018. Second, we extracted all relevant factual claims made in these submissions and 30 
noted if any evidence was referenced in support. Third, we assessed the quality of evidence 31 
using independence from UPFI, nature, and publication route as indicators. Lastly, where peer-32 
reviewed research was cited, we examined if the claims made could be justified by the source 33 
cited.  Results: Across 26 included consultation responses, factual claims around regulation 34 
were made in 18, though only ten referenced any evidence at all. Of all 114 claims made, 39 35 
pieces of identifiable evidence were cited in support of 56 claims. Of the 39 distinct pieces of 36 
evidence, two thirds were industry-funded or -linked, with only 16 externally peer-reviewed. 37 
Over half of industry-funded or -linked academic articles failed to declare a conflict of interest. 38 
Overall, of only six claims which drew on peer-reviewed and independent research, none 39 
appropriately represented the source. Discussion: UPFI respondents made far-reaching claims 40 
which were rarely supported by high-quality, independent evidence. This indicates that there 41 
are few if any benefits from consulting actors with such a clear conflict of interest.  42 
3 
SUMMARY BOX 43 
What is already known? 44 
• There is growing evidence that regulatory policies are more effective than voluntary 45 
industry measures in addressing obesity and dietary non-communicable diseases which 46 
pose a growing threat to public health. 47 
• Ultra-processed food industry actors claim to be aligned with evidence-based 48 
policymaking, but nonetheless consistently oppose evidence-based regulatory policies 49 
in favour of voluntary approaches.  50 
What are the new findings? 51 
• Our research shows that, in response to WHO consultations, ultra-processed food 52 
industry groups made many factual claims to oppose regulation and promote alternative 53 
measures, but only cited evidence in support of just over half of all claims. Most 54 
respondents did not make extensive use of evidence. 55 
• The majority of the evidence cited to support these claims lacked key indicators of 56 
quality such as independence or external peer-review. 57 
• Where industry respondents cited peer-reviewed research evidence, they often failed to 58 
represent the source accurately. 59 
What do the new findings imply? 60 
• In line with previous research on commercial use of evidence, our study suggests that 61 
ultra-processed food industry actors not only tend to provide evidence which lacks key 62 
quality indicators, but also employ evidential practices which serve to create doubt 63 
about the public health evidence. 64 
• As such, industry actors may not only feed lower-quality evidence into policy 65 
processes; mirroring discourse around science and evidence could also potentially 66 
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bolster the credibility of themselves and their aguments. Thus, those developing public 67 
health policies or policy recommendations should reconsider if and how they engage 68 
with commercial actors.  69 
5 
INTRODUCTION 70 
Approximately ten million global deaths per year are attributable to unhealthy diets,1 2 a key 71 
risk factor for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancers, cardiovascular disease, 72 
and diabetes type 2.3 Over recent decades, it has become increasingly evident that industry self-73 
regulation is less effective to improve diets than government regulation.4-16 Yet, and despite 74 
sustained calls by the public health community for comprehensive regulatory frameworks to 75 
safeguard children’s right to health in particular,17-20 such policies remain sporadic. This 76 
disconnect reflects the significant role played by politics, values, ideas, and discourse, as well 77 
as the notion that all evidence is socially constructed,21 contestable, and open to 78 
interpretation.22-24 Narrow conceptions of evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) largely fail 79 
to account for this real-world context in which evidence and policy are created.25 The 80 
alternative term evidence-informed policymaking has emerged more recently, explicitly 81 
acknowledging that while the best available evidence should be utilised, decisions are not 82 
purely based on technical considerations.26 Regardless of differences in terminology, it is clear 83 
that efforts to improve the uptake of knowledge in public health policy over recent decades 84 
have firmly positioned evidence as a source of power and legitimacy in decision-making.25 27 85 
Crucially, this goes beyond the instrumental power of evidence and its producers or users, 86 
extending to the discursive power actors can derive from claims to scientific knowledge and 87 
authority.  88 
The fundamentally political nature of policymaking is particularly noticeable where powerful 89 
commercial entities find themselves facing a threat of regulation: multinational companies 90 
involved in the sale of ultra-processed food and beverage products as well as their 91 
representative groups (the ultra-processed food industry, UPFI) have consistently engaged in 92 
‘corporate political activity’ to prevent, delay, or weaken regulatory policies,28-34 which has 93 
been identified as a key barrier to effective dietary public health policy.35 36 Large volumes of 94 
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research on the tobacco industry37-40 and now increasingly on the UPFI30 32 41-45 and other 95 
unhealthy commodity industries46-49 show that corporate actors’ ability to shape and use 96 
evidence in their own interest plays a key part in their policy influencing strategies.50  97 
Even preceding an acute policy debate, corporate influence on science can shape the body of 98 
evidence on a topic, thereby influencing what is perceived as a problem and which solutions 99 
are considered. Research funded by UPFI entities or conducted by academics with a conflict 100 
of interest (COI) appears more likely to reach conclusions which are favourable or simply non-101 
threathening to the donor industry.51-55 Systematic reviews where authors declared a COI, for 102 
instance, were found to be five times more likely to conclude no positive association between 103 
sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) consumption and weight gain than independent reviews.53 104 
On the other hand, a less studied facet of the interface between public health policy, evidence, 105 
and corporations is the strategic use of evidence within the policymaking process. Existing 106 
public health research on this topic has focused predominantly on tobacco control56-58 and 107 
alcohol policy,59-61 with only two articles, to our knowledge, systematically exploring use of 108 
evidence within dietary NCD policy.28 62 Largely divisible into two analytical strands, 109 
examinations of the nature of evidence used by commercial actors and of how this evidence 110 
or, more broadly, the concept of evidence are used. The available research suggests that 111 
unhealthy commodity industry actors predominantly use evidence which is not independent 112 
and externally peer-reviewed—thus lower in quality—and where they do use scientific 113 
evidence, tend to misrepresent the source.28 56-58 60 62 114 
This paper aims to combine both of these analytical strands to explore how UPFI actors 115 
promote their NCD policy preferences at the World Health Organization (WHO). It builds on 116 
a previous study where we document how UPFI associations opposed regulatory approaches 117 
such as marketing restrictions, mandatory labelling, and particularly SSB taxation in 118 
consultations held to inform WHO recommendations.63 At their core, claims focused on 119 
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conveying the narrative that regulatory policies would not have the desired public health effect, 120 
would lead to unintended negative consequences, and that alternatives to regulation would be 121 
equally or more effective. In line with earlier research,30 43 64 we showed that UPFI actors 122 
widely espoused the concept of EBPM and made prominent use of terms related to science and 123 
evidence to justify opposition to regulatory approaches. In light of these industry claims to take 124 
an evidence-based approach, we aim to investigate whether and how evidence was used to 125 
support factual claims on regulation in recent WHO consultations. Specifically, we ask: 126 
1. To what extent did UPFI actors refer to evidence when making factual claims about 127 
policies? 128 
2. What types of evidence did UPFI actors refer to when making factual claims about 129 
policies? Was it independent and peer-reviewed? 130 
3. Where peer-reviewed research was cited to support factual claims, does the claim 131 
accurately reflect the source content? 132 
To address the last research question, we draw on concepts from agnotology, a term coined by 133 
Proctor65 to describe the study of the deliberate spread of ignorance, which posits that 134 
policymaking may be shaped by so-called agnogenic practices, “methods of representing, 135 
communicating, and producing scientific research and evidence which work to create 136 
ignorance or doubt irrespective of the strength of the underlying evidence”.62 Previous 137 
research exploring agnogenic practices in consultations for UK tobacco plain packaging58 and 138 
the South African SSB tax62 found that corporate actors used techniques such as quoting 139 
evidence in misleading ways, mimicking scientific critique to undermine the public health 140 




To explore how evidence was used by commercial actors in global-level policy debates, we 144 
analysed UPFI responses to WHO consultations on NCD policy. Specifically, we focused on 145 
arguments against the statutory regulation of unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages, 146 
assessing the evidence cited in this context for markers of quality. To establish whether peer-147 
reviewed evidence was represented accurately, we also conducted a verification-oriented cross-148 
documentary analysis which compares claims made with the cited source documents.58 62 149 
Data 150 
We systematically searched the WHO Headquarters website for consultations held between 151 
2016 and 2018 which covered dietary NCD policy, were global in scope, and for which all 152 
responses were published in full. Four consultations met our criteria: the web-based 153 
consultation of the WHO Independent High-level Commission on NCDs,66 the consultation on 154 
the Member State-led draft outcome document for the WHO Global Conference on NCDs 155 
(‘Montevideo roadmap’),67 and the consultations on updating appendix 3 of the WHO global 156 
NCD action plan 2013–202068 and the zero draft Shanghai Declaration on Health 157 
Promotion.69 The consultations are described in more detail elsewhere.63 From the 393 total 158 
responses to these consultations, we extracted all responses made on behalf of the UPFI, 159 
starting with all private sector submissions (as categorised by WHO) to identify submissions 160 
overtly representing the UPFI (i.e. corporations manufacturing ultra-processed foods/ soft 161 
drinks or holding a financial interest in their sale, or business associations who self-describe as 162 
representing the latter). Of the identified 33 responses from UPFI actors—all business 163 
associations—we excluded six which were not in English70-75 and one which contained only a 164 
copy of the consultation document,76 leaving 26 submissions.  165 
 166 
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Identification of factual claims and evidence used to support them 167 
Our analysis contentrated on statements which opposed regulatory approaches to dietary 168 
NCDs, as we could not identify any which supported the introduction of new statutory 169 
regulation. Using Atlas.ti77 software, the lead author coded all instances within the 26 included 170 
submissions where factual claims—defined as statements which appear to convey a fact rather 171 
than a belief, opinion, or idea—were made in relation to policy effects. Thus, statements which 172 
merely referred to the existence of policies or commitments without discussing their effects 173 
were not included. Factual claims were coded into three core categories and two sub-categories 174 
which we developed after in-depth reading of the documents (Table 1). Where a sentence made 175 
more than one of the assertions below, these were counted as two separate claims. 176 
 177 
Table 1. Categorisation framework for factual claims. 178 
Factual claim category Detail 
1: Regulation does not 
work 
Claims that statutory approaches to regulating unhealthy 
products, in particular SSB taxes, do not have the intended 
benefits for public health, arguing that a policy will fail or has 
previously failed to reduce consumption of these products. 
1.1: The rationale for 
regulation is flawed 
Claims which do not directly refer to policy effects, but question 
the causal mechanisms underlying obesity and dietary NCDs 
which regulatory approaches seek to tackle, for instance, the link 
between obesity and/or NCDs and the target products. 
2: Regulation will have 
unintended negative 
consequences 
Some respondents went further to suggest that regulatory 
policies may have negative economic consequences or will even 
be counterproductive, for instance increasing the consumption 
of other unhealthy products. 
3: Alternatives to 
regulation work 
well/better 
Claims that alternatives to regulation—information campaigns, 
self- or co-regulation—would work equally well or better than 
regulation to address obesity or dietary NCDs. This forms an 
important pillar of a broader argument that regulatory policies 
are not needed. 
3.1: Compliance with Statements suggesting that industry compliance with self- or co-
10 
self- or co-regulation is 
high 
regulation is high, thus implying positive effects without 
directly referring to public health outcomes. 
 179 
Next, we coded whether any evidence was referenced in support of the claim, and extracted it 180 
into a spreadsheet. We adopted a broad definition of evidence as formal and informal written 181 
sources, such as reports, journal articles, press coverage, blogs, and opinion pieces. We 182 
included all instances where evidence was formally cited (at the end of a page or submission), 183 
or referred to in the text, provided enough information was available to identify it through a 184 
web search. Links to general websites were not included as they do not clearly refer to a distinct 185 
piece of evidence. Where coding decisions were challenging or uncertain, this was resolved in 186 
discussion between the first and second author. 187 
Analysis 188 
We conducted two separate analyses. Firstly, we assessed the quality of all evidence referenced 189 
in support of factual claims on policy effects. Secondly, we assessed how peer-reviewed 190 
research was used in this context. 191 
Analysis of evidential quality 192 
We adopted the criteria from Evans-Reeves et al78 and Hatchard et al56 to assess the quality of 193 
evidence referenced: independence from the UPFI, nature of evidence, and publication route 194 
(see Table 1 for detail). Independence was assessed by first searching if the consultation 195 
submission itself stated a link between an UPFI entity and the evidence cited. If this was not 196 
the case, we went on to screen the cited piece of evidence for a funding or conflict or interest 197 
statement. If none was declared, we conducted web searches for the authors in combination 198 
with the name of the organisation which cited the evidence in its consultation response, and the 199 
four largest packaged food and soft drink companies (The Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, 200 
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Nestlé, Mondelez79 80). This sample was selected because large corporations have been found 201 
to be more involved in funding nutrition research compared to smaller companies and trade 202 
associations.55 We also read author CVs and short biographies where available. Evidence was 203 
classified as clearly independent if it was published by an intergovernmental organisation or 204 
government, or if a clear funding statement was available and did not list any recent (<6 yrs) 205 
UPFI financial links, and web searches did not reveal any UPFI connections. The nature of 206 
evidence was categorised as research, opinion, strategy documents, or raw data. To assess the 207 
origins of evidence, we categorised the publication route as either peer-reviewed journals and 208 
other academic outlets, intergovernmental organisations and governments, or publications by 209 
private companies and organisations. We separately assessed if academic sources had been 210 
externally peer-reviewed. For industry-funded and industry-linked academic publications, we 211 
also noted whether the source declared a COI. We ran descriptive analyses in IBM SPSS.81 212 
 213 
Table 2. Coding framework for cited evidence. 214 
Category Codes Description 
Independence Industry-funded Statement included that the research was 
financially supported by a food industry entity (i.e. 
UPFI corporations, business associations, and other 
organisations majority-funded or -run by UPFI 
corporations). 
Industry-linked No statement or other indication that the research 
was directly funded by the UPFI, but evidence of 
other connection: e.g., author(s) or publishing 
organisation have financial links to UPFI entities 
(within 5 years of publication). 
Appears 
independent 
Insufficient or no information provided on funding 
and COI on document/organisational website, but 
no evidence of prior connection with the UPFI can 
be found through additional searches. 
Clearly The source is published by a government or 
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independent multilateral body or (if published by an academic 
journal or private organisation) provides detailed 
information about the funding of the work or 
clearly states independence from the food industry. 
Searches for author(s) do not show any evidence of 
links to industry (within 5 years of publication). 
Nature of 
evidence 
Research Primary or secondary research, including, e.g., 
surveys, experimental studies, literature reviews, 
interviews, and critiques. 
Opinion Written pieces largely based on opinion, including 
those with some supporting evidence and those 
which made no attempt to refer to any evidence in 
either a formal or casual capacity. 
Strategy documents Outlines a strategy or plan of action, e.g., 
organisation annual report including evaluation of 
previous year and plans for the future. This may 
include a combination of research, opinion, and 
statistics/data. 
Raw data Data without the underlying methodological detail 




journals and other 
academic outlets 
Published by peer-reviewed journals or other 
academic outlets such as University websites. 
Official IGO or 
government 
publications 
Publications by national government bodies or 





Publications by private companies, consultancies, 
think tanks or other organisations (includes private 
international organisations such as WEF). 
Published by the 
press 
Print or online news publication. 
External peer-
review 
Peer-reviewed Published in a peer-reviewed journal (exceptions, 
checked on a per-case basis: conference abstracts, 
commentary pieces). 
Not peer-reviewed Includes, for example news articles, blogs, 
company reports, private research reports, and 




Analysis of use of scientific evidence 216 
To examine how scientific evidence is used by industry actors, a verification-oriented cross-217 
documentary analysis was conducted for all instances where peer-reviewed research articles 218 
were cited to support relevant factual claims. In each case, we compared the statement made 219 
with the cited source to assess whether the claim reflected the latter. During this process, we 220 
noted where agnogenic practices occurred, drawing on the typology developed by Ulucanlar et 221 
al58 based on an analysis of tobacco industry misuse of scientific evidence (Table 3). 222 
 223 
Table 3. Analytical framework for use of scientific evidence, adapted from Ulucanlar et 224 
al’sevidential strategies.58 225 
Industry practice Description 
Misleading quoting of 
evidence 
Inaccurate reporting from published scientific research, 
including misquoting, selective quoting, or misinterpretation 
Mimicked scientific 
critique  
Detailed inspection of published research, superficially 
resembling scientific peer review and using scientific 
terminology. For instance, seeking methodological 
perfection or insisting on methodological uniformity. 
Evidential landscaping  The promotion of alternative evidence or exclusion of 
relevant public health evidence. 
 226 
RESULTS 227 
Factual claims and evidence used to support them 228 
UPFI actors made 114 separate factual claims in 18 of the 26 included submissions (Figure 1). 229 
Of these 114 claims, 66 challenged regulatory policies (claim categories 1, 1.1, 2) and 48 230 
14 
supported alternative policies such as self- or co-regulation (claim categories 3, 3.1). With the 231 
exception of two claims related to advertising, all claims countering regulatory policies focused 232 
on fiscal policy. The promotion of alternatives to regulation spanned across a wide range of 233 
measures such as voluntary reformulation and labelling, advertising codes, and public-private 234 
partnerships. 235 
Only 71 of the 114 claims in ten of the 26 responses actually referred to any evidence. Yet, 236 
only in 56 of the 71 factual claims citing evidence was this evidence identifiable: the remaining 237 
lacked key information such as title, year published, or author, and one item was paywalled 238 
market research data. 239 
[Figure 1] 240 
 241 
The remaining 43 factual claims were made without any reference to a specific piece of 242 
evidence, despite some making strong statements with casual references to ‘the evidence’, as 243 
exemplified by the Italian business association Federalimentare82 which asserted that 244 
available scientific evidence on sugar does not support a causal link between 245 
sugars consumption and obesity and associated chronic disease. As an 246 
example, while sugar consumption decreased in UK, Australia and Canada, 247 
the obesity rate grew in their respective populations.  248 
Similarly, the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA)83 claimed, without providing 249 
evidence in support:  250 
[…] the UK salt reduction initiative, a public-private partnership led by the 251 
UK government which has resulted in the reduction of average daily salt 252 
intakes by 15% since 2001. Similar salt reduction initiatives and trans fat 253 
and calorie reduction strategies around the world have also proven effective.  254 
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The 56 claims with identifiable references were made by only five business associations: the 255 
International Council of Beverages Associations (ICBA), IFBA, the Grocery Manufacturers 256 
Association (now Consumer Brands Association84), Food Industry Asia, and the German 257 
Federation for Food Law and Food Science (now Food Federation Germany85). The majority 258 
of these claims were made by ICBA who participated in three of the four included 259 
consultations. 260 
Quality of evidence 261 
The 56 claims citing identifiable evidence referred to 39 separate pieces of evidence. Figure 2 262 
summarises overall findings on quality of evidence, showing that although a significant 263 
proportion of the evidence cited was research published in higher-quality outlets (academic 264 
journals, governmental/intergovernmental organisations), the majority was neither 265 
independent nor peer-reviewed. Only four cited items were independent, peer-reviewed 266 
research.  267 
[Figure 2] 268 
 269 
Independence 270 
Of these 39 pieces of evidence, just nine (23.1%) were clearly independent, while 13 ( 33.3%) 271 
were industry-funded; 13 (33.3%) were industry-linked, four (10.3%) appeared independent 272 
but did not provide sufficient information to conclusively rule out industry links. In most pieces 273 
of evidence classified as industry-linked, one or more of the authors had received funding from 274 
UPFI entities (see Supplementary File 1 for details). In particular, claims supporting 275 
alternatives to regulation (categories 2 and 3)—most often self-regulatory initiatives—heavily 276 
relied on evidence that was not independent (75% industry-linked/-funded). This encompassed 277 
predominantly industry-conducted or commissioned evaluations of their own commitments. 278 
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Of the 13 items of industry-funded or industry-linked evidence which were published in 279 
academic journals, only four clearly declared a COI.86-89 An additional two reported industry 280 
financial contributions, but did so under ‘acknowledgements’ or ‘acknowlegements and 281 
disclosures’.90 91 Of the rest, four did not have a COI section,92-95 whilst three articles explicitly 282 
declared no COI,96-98 one thereof not only linked to, but funded by an UPFI entity.96  283 
Nature of evidence 284 
Of the 39 pieces of evidence, 26 (66.7%) were research, eight (20.5%) were strategy 285 
documents, four (10.3%) were opinion pieces, and one (2.6%) was raw data. Notably, 19 of 286 
the 26 research-based sources were industry-funded or -linked. 287 
Publication route 288 
Of the 39 pieces of evidence, 18 (46.2%), were published by academic outlets, closely followed 289 
by private companies and organisations which had published 18 (43.6%). This included reports 290 
published by the submitting business associations themselves and evidence from think-tanks 291 
and research firms such as Oxford Economics99 100 and McKinsey Global Institute.101 292 
‘Overcoming obesity: An initial economic analysis’ by the McKinsey Global Institute was also 293 
the most referenced piece of evidence across all submissions, cited nine times across five 294 
consultation responses by three different business associations. A further four items (10.3%) 295 
were published by intergovernmental organisations or governments. Only 16 (41%) pieces of 296 
evidence cited to support factual claims were externally peer-reviewed. This is less than the 297 
number of items published in peer-reviewed journals, as two referenced conference abstracts 298 
do not appear to have undergone external peer-review.89 92 299 
 300 
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Use of scientific evidence 301 
In this section we address how scientific evidence was used to support the factual claims around 302 
policy effects. We discuss examples under each core category of claims: questioning regulatory 303 
policies (claim categories 1, 1.1, and 2) and promoting alternatives to regulation (claim 304 
categories 3 and 3.1). 305 
Questioning regulatory policies 306 
Factual claims that regulatory policies do not work or will have negative consequences, 307 
although made in 12 responses from seven organisations, were only backed by peer-reviewed 308 
research evidence in three responses, all made by one organisation, ICBA. They cited three 309 
independent research articles to support five claims that SSB taxation will not work or will 310 
have negative consequences,102-104 and a fourth to question the link between SSBs and 311 
obesity.105  312 
To question the effectiveness of the policy, they cited a review by independent scientists, Bes-313 
Rastrollo et al,102 in their submission to the consultation on Appendix 3 to WHO Global NCD 314 
Action Plan 2013-2020,106 stating that: 315 
a recent review summarizing all data related to taxation of sugars found that 316 
taxation did not affect obesity rates [reference: Bes-Rastrollo et al]. In this 317 
summary, it was found that of the six published studies to date where data 318 
had been measured (as opposed to modeled), five found no effect of taxation 319 
whatsoever, while the sixth found less than a 1.8 kg difference in body weight 320 
after 20 years. 321 
This appears to reflect a technique Ulucanlar et al58 term misquoting of evidence, as the original 322 
source concludes that the "best available scientific evidence suggests that added sugars, 323 
especially SSB consumption, are an important risk factor for weight gain and obesity" and that 324 
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"[t]he tax tool alone on added sugars appears insufficient to curb the obesity epidemic, but it 325 
needs to be included in a multicomponent and comprehensive structural strategy to combat 326 
obesity".102 While the second part of ICBA’s statement, focusing on observation studies, is 327 
accurate, it omits important contextual information, firstly that that most tax rates in the 328 
observational sample were lower than the recommended 20% threshold, as remarked by Bes-329 
Rastrollo et al themselves, and secondly, that overall, “results found a significant inverse 330 
association between SSB excise taxes and weight gain or obesity, although the magnitude of 331 
the estimates of effect was small”.102 332 
In their submission to the WHO Independent High-Level Commission on NCDs and a similar 333 
comment on Montevideo Roadmap 2018-2030, ICBA selectively quoted a publication by Silver 334 
et al104 to support an argument that SSB taxation would not only fail to reduce SSB 335 
consumption, but also increase the consumption of other unhealthy products: 336 
In Berkeley, California, a tax on SSBs has caused calorie intake to rise rather 337 
than decrease. For instance, a recent study of the SSB tax implemented in 338 
Berkeley, California, found that while caloric consumption of taxed 339 
beverages dropped by a statistically insignificant margin of an average of 340 
six calories per day – equivalent to a bite of an apple, caloric consumption 341 
of untaxed beverages rose by an average of 32 calories per day, resulting in 342 
a net increase of 26 calories per person per day resulting from the tax 343 
[reference: Silver et al]. In other words, consumers switched from soft drinks 344 
to milkshakes, smoothies and other similarly calorie-dense products – 345 
resulting in more calories consumed. 346 
In fact, Silver et al concluded that one year after the introduction of the Berkeley SSB tax, 347 
“prices of SSBs increased in many, but not all, settings, SSB sales declined, and sales of 348 
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untaxed beverages (especially water) and overall study beverages rose in Berkeley”.104 The 349 
figure reported by ICBA only refers to the self-reported SSB intake which decreased by 19.8% 350 
but was statistically insignificant. The authors reported statistically significant results for an 351 
increase 15.6% in water sales and a 9.6% decrease in SSB sales. Self-reports also indicated an 352 
increase in other caloric beverages such as milk-based products and smoothies, but ICBA failed 353 
to address the authors’ observation that this contrasts with the substitution pattern seen in the 354 
“point-of-sale data, which showed an increase in water sales and smaller but still significant 355 
increases in sales of plain milk and untaxed fruit, vegetable, and tea drinks”.104 356 
Discussing an independent observational study by Colchero et al103 on changes in purchasing 357 
after the introduction of an SSB tax in Mexico in their submission to the WHO consultation on 358 
Appendix 3 of the Global NCD Action Plan,106 ICBA omitted important qualifying information 359 
to suggest that the study demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the policy: 360 
Although one widely-publicized study indicates that purchases of taxed 361 
beverages decreased by an average of six percent in 2014 [reference: 362 
Colchero et al], it is important to note that the calorie consumption from 363 
beverages has declined only slightly – roughly between two and six fewer 364 
calories per day in a diet of more than 3000 calories per day in Mexico 365 
[reference: FAO, National Institute of Statistics and Geography, and 366 
National Association of Soft Drink and Carbonated Water Producers], 367 
which is a daily caloric decrease of less than one half of one percent. 368 
Though the 6% average figure is correct, ICBA failed to mention that the decline in 369 
consumption had grown progressively, reaching 12% by the end of 2014. Moreover, in a 370 
footnote, ICBA also appeared to mimick scientific critique by insisting on methodological 371 
perfectionism, pointing out ostensible methodological flaws to dismiss Colchero et al’s 372 
20 
findings: 373 
This study had a number of methodological and other limitations. For 374 
example: (1) it was an observational study so causality could not be 375 
established; (2) rural populations were ignored and traditional stores […] 376 
were likely underrepresented (as were the working poor or very poor) since 377 
the study was based on Nielsen panel data covering 53 cities each with 378 
50,000 or more residents; (3) the data was based on purchases and not 379 
consumption; and (4) the study was not controlled for other environmental 380 
factors (e.g., information campaigns that could have had a bigger impact 381 
than the actual tax). 382 
It is noteworthy that ICBA directed no such critcal assessment towards the favourable, typically 383 
lower-quality evidence it cited throughout this submission. 384 
ICBA invoked six articles to question the well-established107 link between sugar or SSBs and 385 
obesity or negative health outcomes. Five of these were either industry-funded or industry-386 
linked.86-88 90 91 The sixth, independent study,105 was cited correctly to the extent that ICBA 387 
echoed the authors’ finding that the evidence on the relationship between SSB consumption 388 
and body mass index is mixed if adjusted for total calorie intake. However, a preceding claim 389 
by ICBA that “the overall weight of the scientific evidence on sugar and/or sugar-sweetened 390 
beverages show that they do not have a unique effect on body weight beyond their contribution 391 
to total calorie intake” is not supported by the article which states that its conflicting results, 392 
while potentially weakening confidence in association strength, do not disprove an association 393 
between SSBs and obesity. This also appears to be a misquotation of evidence.58 394 
Promoting alternatives to regulation 395 
IFBA and the Grocery Manufacturers Association were the only organisations to use peer-396 
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reviewed research articles in support of self- or co-regulation. They did so in eight instances, 397 
and all articles were either industry-funded or industry-linked.93-97 398 
IFBA,83 for instance, uses two academic publications95 97 to support its statement that EPODE 399 
(Ensemble Prévenons l'Obésité Des Enfants), a public-private programme partly funded by 400 
companies such as Nestlé and the Coca-Cola Company,108 “has shown encouraging results in 401 
preventing childhood obesity in France and Belgium and has reduced the socioeconomic gap 402 
in obesity prevalence in France”. The first paper by Van Koperen et al97—which we classified 403 
as industry-linked because two of the authors had accepted UPFI funding in the five years 404 
before publication—did not set out to examine the effectiveness of EPODE, but to “learn more 405 
on the dynamics and key elements of the EPODE program tackling childhood overweight and 406 
obesity to support future research and evaluation”, presenting a logic model.97 Similarly, the 407 
second paper95 which was supported by The Coca-Cola Company and whose lead author also 408 
contributed to the Van Koperen article, aimed to “provide a detailed description of EPODE 409 
methodology, including its broad and overarching approach to strengthening and enriching 410 
CBIs [community-based interventions] aimed at preventing childhood obesity”.95 The article 411 
does, however, suggest that decreases in obesity prevalence in EPODE pilot towns are 412 
attributable to the programme, with IFBA repeating a statement made in the article’s abstract 413 
that EPODE has “shown encouraging results in preventing childhood obesity in France and 414 
Belgium and has reduced the socioeconomic gap in obesity prevalence in France”.95 415 
DISCUSSION 416 
By exploring UPFI use of evidence in global health governance for the first time, we add to an 417 
emerging body of literature investigating how unhealthy commodity industries use evidence to 418 
oppose public health regulation.57-59 62 In summary, our work indicates that the factual claims 419 
UPFI actors made to oppose the regulation of unhealthy products in consultation with the WHO 420 
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were largely unsupported by high-quality, independent evidence, and where scientific evidence 421 
was used, it was often misrepresented.  422 
It is noteworthy that, despite claims to support EBPM and language which mimics scientific 423 
reasoning,63 over half of the UPFI submissions we analysed did not refer to any evidence. Even 424 
among those which did, a significant proportion of claims opposing dietary public health 425 
regulation were not supported with any evidence. Where evidence was cited, the majority was 426 
neither peer-reviewed nor independent: of 114 factual claims, only six were made based on 427 
peer-reviewed and independent research, all of which misrepresented the original source to 428 
some degree. These six claims were all made by the same organisation, ICBA, to oppose SSB 429 
taxation. The group, which represents soft drinks producers, submitted some of the longest 430 
consultation responses with the most references to evidence, which goes a long way toward 431 
explaining the skew of our sample towards SSB taxation. 432 
Overall, the arguments made by UPFI respondents to oppose statutory regulation do not align 433 
with the public health evidence. Claims that regulation to address dietary NCDs will not have 434 
the desired effect, predominantly levelled at SSB taxation, contradict independent evidence 435 
which supports the potential of taxes to favourably influence dietary behaviours.109-112 436 
Although the evidence in favour of SSB taxes has grown substantially since the consultations 437 
were held, high-quality publications were available when the majority of consultation 438 
submissions were written.113 UPFI respondents also questioned the links between their 439 
products or specific ingredients—predominantly sugar—and obesity or dietary NCDs. 440 
However, a substantial body of independent evidence clearly links added sugar intake,114 and 441 
SSBs in particular,115-117 to obesity and a range of NCDs. Similarly, claims of negative 442 
economic consequences were primarily made in the context of SSB taxation. While industry-443 
commissioned evidence does tend to report such impacts,118 independent research suggests that 444 
SBB taxes have not had negative impacts on employment and the wider ecomony,118-121 or 445 
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even businesses.112 Initial evidence suggests that other regulatory policies which were 446 
contested by industry—mandatory labelling and advertising restrictions—also work as 447 
intended122 123 and do not affect employment.124 448 
Independent evidence also indicates that self-regulation is not sufficient to address the issues 449 
of obesity and dietary NCDs.4-12 Self-regulation of advertising, for instance, does not appear to 450 
be effective enough to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food adverts6 8 125-128 and 451 
industry codes have widely been criticised as weak by public health researchers.6 129 In line 452 
with evidence which suggests that industry-funded research results in more favourable 453 
conclusions,51-55 industry evaluations of self-regulatory codes tend to report much higher 454 
effectiveness and compliance than independent evaluations.128 This may explain our 455 
observation that the vast majority of claims in favour of self- or co-regulatory approaches relied 456 
on industry-produced or -commissioned materials.  457 
When assessing the independence of cited evidence, we found it remarkable that the majority 458 
of industry-funded or -linked academic articles did not declare a COI. While some simply did 459 
not contain a COI section, others explicitly declared that they had no COI. Of those that did 460 
declare an interest, this was at times combined with the acknowledgements. This exemplifies 461 
why current reporting practices are inadequate and highlights the urgent need for enforced and 462 
structured COI reporting processes within and beyond public health.130  463 
There are indications that commercial actors draw on a shared set of preferred evidence and 464 
consultancies across levels of governance and policy settings. For instance, reports by the 465 
research firm Oxford Economics99 100—an organisation with a history of producing reports for 466 
the tobacco industry131—were also cited by respondents to the South African SSB tax 467 
consultation.62 The most frequently cited item in our study, a discussion paper funded and 468 
written by McKinsey Global Institute,101 which ranks taxation and media restrictions as low-469 
impact interventions to address obesity, but concludes that only comprehensive measures will 470 
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work to tackle obesity, has also been cited in other policy debates to oppose public health 471 
regulation.64 132 472 
In addition to the agnogenic practices described above, abstract mentions of ‘the evidence’ or 473 
‘science’ without reference to concrete evidence, as well as vague expressions of alignment 474 
with EBPM, appear to form part of attempts to position industry as legitimate actor in public 475 
health policy. Sitting beyond the instrumental role of evidence, this rhethorical facet may play 476 
a role in lending discursive power and credibility to policy actors. 477 
Overall, our findings confirm existing research on the use of evidence by unhealthy commodity 478 
industries in public health policy,59-61 133 adding to a growing body of literature which indicates 479 
high levels of coherence in practices across sectors.134-137 This warrants reconsideration of 480 
engagement with actors who hold a clear commercial interest in a deregulated food system, 481 
perhaps towards an approach more coherent with Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework 482 
Convention on Tobacco Control which demands that public health policymaking is protected 483 
from the vested interests of the tobacco industry.138 Where engagement does take place, 484 
adjustments to consultation processes could be made, both to encourage the use of higher-485 
quality evidence (and recognition were there is none), and to enable those developing policies 486 
or policy recommendations to more readily assess cited sources. One way to achieve this may 487 
be to require consultation respondents to declare origins and funding of referenced evidence, 488 
particularly where the submitting organisation itself has financially supported the research. 489 
Consultation documents may also ask respondents to provide evidence in support of their 490 
claims in a structured way and directly attach sources where these are not publicly available, 491 
thus facilitating evidence appraisal by policymakers. 492 
Limitations 493 
Our findings on evidence use were heavily driven by a small set of actors who referenced large 494 
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amounts of evidence, whereas the majority referenced little or no evidence. This may limit their 495 
generalisability. While we went beyond declarations in the cited sources to identify industry 496 
links to the evidence, our web-based investigation is unlikely to have identified all extant 497 
connections. Our research focused on UPFI actors and does not compare how non-industry 498 
actors such as Member States or civil society used evidence in their submissions. We 499 
concentrated on this sub-set of respondents due to the inherent conflict between the interests 500 
of the UPFI and public health, which has manifested in UPFI opposition to policies needed to 501 
address the considerable burden of obesity and NCDs.34 63 139 502 
Conclusions 503 
Our findings suggest that UPFI actors’ rhetorical alignment with EBPM63 remains mere 504 
rhetoric in a majority of cases. Stakeholder consultation, while potentially valuable in that it 505 
allows communities and civil society to feed into policy documents, also explicitly gives a 506 
voice to the often better-resourced industries whose products are at threat of being regulated. 507 
This becomes an issue when—as shown in this study—industry actors question the benefits 508 
and emphasise the costs of public health regulation while supporting their preferred 509 
alternatives, largely by promoting low-quality evidence or misrepresenting higher-quality 510 
evidence. Thus, it is important to critically evaluate the claims made and evidence used in 511 
consultation submissions, a process which is time-consuming and would pose a substantial 512 
burden on policymakers. On a practical level, this might be eased through clear reporting 513 
requirements and thresholds regarding the quality and independence of evidence. This does 514 
not, however, address the less tangible but potentially powerful gain of legitimacy which 515 
commercial actors may achieve by aligning themselves with the ideal of EBPM. In light of 516 
similar conduct of other unhealthy commodity industries, it is worth questioning the value 517 
engagement with commercial interests adds to policy development. This is particularly 518 
pertinent as resources could instead be invested into redressing power asymmetries in global 519 
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Figure 1. Evidence use to support different types of claims. Created using flourish studio.81  524 
Figure 2. Quality indicators across all 39 pieces of evidence cited to support factual claims. 525 
Higher quality was indicated where evidence was: clearly independent or appeared 526 
independent, was based on research, published in a peer-reviewed journal or by a 527 
government/intergovernmental organisation, and was externally peer-reviewed. Created using 528 
flourish studio.81 529 
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